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A Defence of a New Perspective on Euthanasia  
 
Abstract 
In two recent papers, Hugh McLachlan, Jacob Busch and Raffaele Rodogno 
have criticised my new perspective on euthanasia.[1] Each paper analyses 
my argument and suggests two flaws. McLachlan identifies what he sees as 
important points regarding the justification of legal distinctions in the absence 
of corresponding moral differences and the professional role of the doctor.[2] 
Busch and Rodogno target my criterion of brain life, arguing that it is a 
necessary but not sufficient condition and that it is not generalisable.[3] In this 
paper I indicate flaws in all of these criticisms, and again suggest that my 
perspective does add something new to the debate. 
 
Introduction: the new perspective 
 In my original paper, I argued that a patient’s body can itself constitute 
unwarranted life support that is keeping him alive against his will. To illustrate 
this, I provided two examples: 
In the first, Adam is dying of lung cancer and is on a ventilator. He is in constant 
pain and needs help eating, drinking, washing and going to the toilet. He regards 
his life as no longer worth living and, with the consent of his family, requests that 
the doctor disconnects the ventilator. In the second case, Brian is dying of 
stomach cancer. He is in constant pain and needs help eating, drinking, washing 
and going to the toilet, although he can breathe easily. He regards his life as no 
longer worth living and, with the consent of his family, requests the doctor to 
administer a medication that will end his life. 
These examples show that the only difference between Adam and Brian 
is that one is being kept alive against his will be a machine, and the other 
by his body. I further argued that the central aspect of personhood in 
patients like Brian is their minds, or their “brain life”, and suggested that 
one of the reasons doctors tend to have problems with euthanasia is that 
they are used to keeping patients’ bodies functioning; therefore, the idea 
that a body could itself provide invasive, unwanted “treatment” that keeps 
the mind alive against the patient’s will might take some getting used to. 
 
Legal and moral distinctions and the doctor’s role 
McLachlan argues that the moral equivalence of killing and letting die is not as 
important as my paper suggests, and that one can justify legal distinctions on 
non-moral grounds. His other main point is that we might consider euthanasia 
to be contrary to the professional role of the doctor, even if there are no 
ethical objections to the practice in general. 
McLachlan begins his argument with a concession. He states that he accepts 
“that Brian’s body can be regarded as a provider of unwanted life-support” but 
that “It does not follow that there is no moral difference between switching off 
a ventilator and administering a lethal injection.”[2] He then adds that “Even if 
there is no moral difference, it is not necessarily unreasonable to choose to 
make a legal difference.” Although he reiterates these moral and legal 
difference points throughout his paper, at no point does he actually offer a 
justification for them. 
In addition, at no point does McLachlan actually indicate what the purported 
moral difference actually is. He states that “to kill is not morally the same as to 
let die, despite the similarity of the outcomes: it can matter how and why what 
is done is done, who does it and to whom it is done”.[2] He then says that we 
can set this issue aside, but this is the very crux of the matter: if Brian and 
Adam have the same doctor, and the why, what and whom are the same, 
what difference does the “how” really make? McLachlan uses the example of 
shooting Brian, but we can easily imagine a situation where a button is 
pushed that will administer a lethal drug to his system, and this button looks 
the same as the button that turns off Adam’s life-support machine. Once 
more, what’s the difference? 
Neither does McLachlan say on what grounds we would justify a legal 
difference if the actions were really morally identical; he just moves quickly on 
to doctors’ duties. But the fact that he thinks doctors should not provide 
euthanasia cannot be the reason for the legal distinction where no moral one 
exists, as he says that other people could legitimately provide it. McLachlan 
provides four examples of cases where there is no moral difference but there 
is a legal one: punishment for murder and attempted murder, driving on the 
left or the right side of the road, hate motivation for murder, and marginally 
underage sex. Quite apart from the fact that many people might think that 
there is a moral difference between murder and attempted murder, none of 
these is a valid comparison for the marginal differences between Adam and 
Brian. If we accept that Brian’s body is keeping him alive against his will, as 
McLachlan does, what are the grounds for treating his situation differently 
from Brian’s? It can only be moral squeamishness about abandoning the 
supposed distinction between killing and letting die. If the argument is that we 
have to draw a line somewhere, it should be between expressing a wish to die 
and not doing so rather than between two different causal methods of bringing 
about death. McLachlan has tried elsewhere to explain what the moral 
difference is between killing and letting die,[4], but even here, as John 
Coggon has pointed out, “If he is correct to assert that there is a moral 
difference between active and passive euthanasia, he fails to demonstrate 
why.”[5] 
McLachlan’s other main point concerns the professional duties of doctors. He 
states that “euthanasia and assisted suicide are contrary to the role and 
professional duty or, at the very least, the central role and professional duty of 
doctors” and also argues that matters of professionalism are not simply 
matters of medical ethics. His conclusion is that doctors are professionally 
obliged not to perform euthanasia, even if euthanasia is morally permissible. 
To take the second argument first, if something is really contrary to a 
professional’s role, it is almost certain to be unethical in some respect. 
McLachlan provides the example of doctors having sex with their patients as 
an example of unprofessional but not unethical behaviour. It is somewhat 
surprising that he simply states this as fact: many would argue that this 
behaviour is both unprofessional and unethical. It is unethical because it could 
be an abuse of power, there could be coercion involved, it might affect how 
the patient is treated with harmful consequences, and there might even be a 
therapeutic misconception (no pun intended). McLachlan also states that “the 
BMA would be a laughing stock if it were thought to permit doctors to kill their 
own patients but not to have sex with them.”[2] This is a hasty comment: in 
fact, killing one’s patient at their request could be both in the patient’s best 
medical interests and a professional duty; having sex with one’s patient would 
be neither, in addition to being unethical for the aforementioned reasons. 
  Secondly, it is far from obvious that it would be unprofessional in any sense 
for a doctor to provide euthanasia, and a case could well be made that it 
should be ethically obligatory in cases like Brian’s. Doctors are obligated not 
simply to prolong their patients’ lives, but also to alleviate their suffering. In 
cases where prolongation of life is no longer in the patient’s best interests or 
treatment is futile, the alleviation of suffering must become the priority, as I 
have argued elsewhere.[6] (As I stated in my paper, “In refusing VAE and AS 
requests, it is almost as if doctors are obeying the “wish” of the patient’s body 
rather than the patient’s mind, as keeping bodies functioning is what doctors 
are habituated to.”[1]) McLachlan states that “Euthanasia and assistance in 
committing suicide are not forms of healthcare treatment. They are called for 
only when healthcare treatment has become futile or unwanted by the 
patient.”[2] He seems not to realise that the same is true of the withdrawal of 
life support, which also kills the patient and is the doctor’s duty. Given 
McLachlan’s insistence that “shooting patients is the same as giving them 
lethal injections”, it is somewhat surprising that he does not say why turning 
off life-support is any different. And in any case, I would argue that assisted 
dying can constitute healthcare treatment, as they aim at alleviating the 
patient’s suffering – that they do so by shortening life is an incidental feature. 
McLachlan also does not mention the fact that many patients die as a direct 
result of doctors increasing their morphine; this is also healthcare treatment 
that kills the patient and in so doing benefits him or her.  
 Furthermore, McLachlan clearly thinks that turning off ventilators is not 
contrary to the professional role of doctors. Why is this, if ‘active’ euthanasia 
would be? Once again, we are left to speculate, given his refusal to address 
exactly what the moral difference is between killing and letting die. He also 
argues that “The status and reputation of doctors might be endangered if their 
roles appear to be ambiguous”, but to many people their status is already 
ambiguous due to their failure to help patients like Brian.  
 Ultimately McLachlan’s rebuttal of my new perspective fails because he 
refuses to engage with its central assertion. He attempts to argue that we 
cannot derive legal conclusions from moral differences, but that was not the 
point of my original paper: it merely illustrated that there is no moral difference 
between killing and letting die, at least in the context of removal of life support 
and stopping a body working. Unfortunately, he cannot make his argument 
about legal distinctions without saying what the reasons for them are, and he 
cannot say what those reasons are without saying exactly what the moral 
difference is. To merely assert that there is no moral difference but that 
doctors shouldn’t aid patients in dying because of professional obligations is 
to sidestep the thrust of my original argument, and his interpretation of 
doctors’ obligations is also flawed. 
 
Brain life and generalisability 
 Jacob Busch and Rafael Rodogno have a different criticism of the new 
perspective. Their two arguments are that the “brain life” criterion that I 
introduce is a necessary, but not a sufficient criterion for personhood, and that 
the criterion is not generalisable to other contexts. They represent my 
argument as follows: 
Premise 1: If X is brain dead then X is dead. i.e. being not brain dead (brain 
alive) 
is a necessary condition for being alive (for being a person) 
 
Premise 2: If being brain alive is a necessary condition for being alive (for being 
a 
person), then brain life is the central aspect of personhood in terminally ill 
patients (i.e. not bodies). 
 
Conclusion: Brain life is the central aspect of personhood in terminally ill 
patients (i.e. not bodies)  [3] 
 
 Busch and Rodogno claim that the conclusion does not follow from the 
premises. In fact, it seems obvious that it does follow, given that premise two 
actually includes the conclusion. We can only suppose that they meant to say 
that the second premise is itself false. The first of their two main criticisms is 
that “even if brain life is a necessary condition for being a person, other 
conditions could be necessary as well.”[3] In other words, it is wrong to 
assume that brain life is the central aspect, even if it is a necessary condition. 
The other criticism is that I “assume that this criterion of personhood, once 
agreed upon in one context, is generalisable to other contexts.” [3] In other 
words, it poses a problem for the new perspective if the brain life criterion 
does not work in other situations. 
 
To take the second of these criticisms first, their argument about 
generalisability fails. I originally limited the applicability of the brain life 
argument to terminally ill patients, and stated simply that: “If we agree that 
brain death is the end of a person, we should adopt brain life as the central 
aspect of personhood in terminal patients and accept that the body is merely 
another type of life support.”[1] I may have been mistaken to say that “we 
should adopt” the brain life criterion, as it is already used inasmuch as brain 
death is used to determine when a person is no longer present. In this sense, 
brain life is already a crucial concept in end-of-life situations; as I said in the 
original paper, “If the definition of the death of a person is brain death, it 
follows that “we” as persons are not identical with our bodies.”[1] Nonetheless, 
I think that the brain life criterion is indeed the central aspect of personhood in 
all contexts. Even if it is not itself sufficient for personhood due to the 
biological fact that brains need bodies to function, it is clearly the most 
necessary criterion, and we can all imagine existing without our bodies, while 
the converse is not true. In end-of-life situations, as our bodies fade and fail, 
our minds and brains become even more central to who we are. Busch and 
Rodogno claim that my perspective should at least be generalisable to other 
areas of medicine, arguing that patients who are about to undergo a 
gynaecological examination are allowed some degree of privacy and 
sensitivity form their doctors. But even if brain life is the central criterion of 
personhood, people are obviously very attached to their bodies, even if their 
bodies are not persons according to my view; it is not surprising that we are 
sensitive about how our bodies are treated. As I have argued, however, 
“Although persons obviously have feelings for their bodies that they do not 
have for external equipment such as a ventilator, such feelings lose all moral 
power when a patient decides that his or her body is now a burden.”[1] 
 
Unfortunately, Busch and Rodogno seem to take their second criticism as a 
given in order to support their first. They seek to provide an example that 
illustrates that other conditions are necessary for personhood and argue that 
a concert pianist whose arms and legs are amputated will be a different 
person from before the accident that necessitated this surgery. First, we 
should bear in mind that I never claimed that brain life was a necessary and 
sufficient condition for personhood; I merely said it was the central aspect.  I 
certainly did not claim that brain life was a sufficient condition for being the 
same person, which is all that their example illustrates. They state that the 
pianist would not regard herself as the same person after the emergency 
surgery, but she would obviously still regard herself as a person. Actually, the 
fact that she still regards herself as a person despite having lost a great deal 
of her body would tend to support my central thesis that the person is the 
mind and brain life is the central criterion. The same applies to their other 
examples of face-transplants and deaf people: their discussion focuses on 
criteria for someone being the same person, while the brain life criterion 
focuses on whether someone is a person. Busch and Rodogno seem to have 
mistaken my claim that brain life is the central aspect of personhood in end-of-
life situations for a much wider claim about personal identity across a wide 
variety of situations. Another way of looking at this is to consider how things 
change for Brian. For most of his life his body is part of him as a person. Then 
it begins to fail, eventually causing him to regard it as something that is 
keeping him alive against his will. In this sense, the patient himself adopts the 
brain life criterion and decides that his body is no longer part of his person, 
just as the concert pianist had to accept that her arms and legs were no 
longer part of her.  
 
A third, minor criticism of my argument is also mentioned. Busch and 
Rodogno also claim that my dualistic perspective faces the problem of 
explaining whether the brain is part of our bodies, in which case it is part of 
the unwarranted system, or it is not part of our bodies,  “which seems 
implausible”. In fact, this is not as much of a problem as it appears. First, I do 
not claim that people are their brains, but that they are their brain activity, or 
their minds, so the criticism is somewhat misplaced. And given that people 
are their brain activity, it makes perfect sense to regard the brain as part of 
the unwarranted life support system. 
 
Conclusion 
 The papers by McLachlan, Busch and Rodogno offer interesting perspectives 
on my new perspective on euthanasia, but the objections that they raise are 
all flawed. McLachlan’s argument about legal distinctions fails because he 
fails to say what they ought be grounded on in the case of euthanasia, and his 
argument about the role of the doctor is based on a misconception. Busch 
and Rodogno overlook the fact that the brain life criterion is not one of 
personal identity, and thus do not realise that brain life is indeed the central 
condition of personhood. Indeed, brain life would be sufficient for personhood 
even if the brain was entirely artificial. Busch and Rodogno claim that I have 
merely provided “a perspective that makes the conclusion that there is little 
distinction between voluntary active euthanasia and voluntary passive 
euthanasia seemingly more palatable”.[1] In fact, that was my only intention 
when I wrote the original paper, and I believe that my new perspective on 
euthanasia does indeed make it clearer than before that there is no distinction 
between killing and letting die. 
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